
TL;DR
Not on its own. A digital product passport (DPP) tells you what a product is supposed to be. It does not prove the item in your hand is that product. The EU data carrier standard, EN 18220, deliberately leaves security features out, and a DPP QR code can be photographed and printed onto a fake.
EU rules do ask for data integrity and fraud prevention, but the new data standard, EN 18246, protects the data, not the physical item. The practical answer is two codes: an open DPP code for information and a closed-loop authentication code beside it.
Does a digital product passport stop counterfeits?
No, not by itself. A DPP is an information system. It was designed to help customers, repairers, recyclers and authorities understand a product, and it does that well. It was not designed to prove that a particular bottle, jacket or handbag is genuine.
In my years selling spirits across Europe, Asia and Latin America, the most damaging fakes were the ones that looked exactly right. A passport that opens the brand's genuine data page does not change that. On a fake, it makes the fake look more convincing.
What does a DPP actually prove?
A DPP proves that a product record exists, held by the brand or its service provider and registered with the EU. Scan a genuine item and you see accurate information about that model, batch or item.
What it cannot tell you is whether the code you scanned was printed by the brand. The passport describes the product the code was issued for, wherever that code happens to be printed.
Why can a DPP QR code be copied onto a fake?
Because it has to be open. ESPR requires passport data to rest on open standards, be free to access and be readable without vendor lock-in. In practice that means a QR code or Data Matrix code that any phone camera can read, usually in the GS1 Digital Link format.
Anything any camera can read, any camera can also capture. A counterfeiter photographs the DPP code on a genuine product, reprints it on fakes, and every fake opens the genuine passport. Nothing in the open standard flags the second, third or thousandth copy.
Be careful with "DPP-ready security" claims
If a vendor says its proprietary code is a compliant DPP carrier on its own, ask how it meets the open access and ISO/IEC 15459 identifier requirements. A code that only works in one company's app is unlikely to qualify.
What does EN 18220 say about security features?
EN 18220 is the European standard for DPP data carriers, cited in the EU Official Journal on 15 July 2026. Its scope explicitly excludes secure elements and other cryptographic security features.
That is a sensible design choice. A data carrier that everyone must be able to read cannot also be a secret. But it confirms the gap: the standard defines how to carry passport data, not how to prove an item is real.
Doesn't ESPR require data integrity?
It does, and this is where many people assume the counterfeiting problem is solved. Article 11 of ESPR says data authentication, reliability and integrity must be ensured, and that passports must be designed so that fraud is avoided. Article 13 also lets future rules require registry data so that a passport's authenticity can be checked.
The supporting standard, EN 18246, was published in September 2026 and covers data authentication, reliability and integrity. Read closely, all of this protects the passport record from being altered or faked. It does not protect the physical product the code is printed on. A genuine, untampered passport opened from a copied code on a fake product passes every data check.
What is the dual-code approach?
Use two codes, each doing the job it is good at. An open DPP code carries the passport and meets the standards. A closed-loop authentication code sits beside it and shows whether the item is genuine.
| Open DPP code (for example GS1 Digital Link QR) | Closed-loop code (Securicode) | |
|---|---|---|
| Main job | Share product information | Verify the code is genuine and show the product it belongs to |
| Who can read it | Anyone, with any phone camera | Anyone, with the free Securicode app |
| Who can create a working code | Any brand, from open standards | Only brands vetted and approved by Securicode |
| What a copy does | Opens the genuine passport | Gets flagged by scan count and impossible movement |
| Meets DPP carrier rules | Yes, when built to the standards | No, and it is not designed to |
Securicode works alongside your Digital Product Passport. It is the authentication layer a DPP lacks, not a replacement for it. See how Securicode sits beside a DPP.
How does this work on a real label?
Rudholm Group, an apparel label and packaging supplier now part of ITL Group, offers this combination on clothing care labels. DPP data is carried through its own DPP service, and a Securicode is printed on the same care label through Rudholm's Variable Data Cloud. Codes are generated only by Securicode and printed securely by Rudholm, so the garment factory receives the finished physical label and never the code as a digital file.
Rudholm puts the point simply: identifying a product is not the same as verifying that it is genuine. For brands facing textile DPP rules, that one label can do both jobs. Read the Rudholm care label case study or see Securicode for apparel and textiles.
Has the EU used this model before?
Yes, in medicines. Since 9 February 2019, the EU Falsified Medicines rules (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/161) have required prescription medicine packs to carry two separate safety features: a unique identifier in an open 2D Data Matrix code, and an anti-tampering device. Identity and physical protection are split on purpose.
EU policy also points this way. The Commission's 2024 toolbox against counterfeiting (Recommendation (EU) 2024/915) encourages advanced tracing systems, including the digital product passport, as part of a wider set of anti-counterfeiting tools.
Do shoppers expect a DPP to prove authenticity?
Many do. In a 2025 survey of 7,800 Vestiaire Collective resale users, BCG found 70% valued DPPs for authentication when buying, even though 65% had never heard of DPPs. That is a resale audience, not the general public, but it shows the expectation.
If shoppers believe a passport proves a product is real, a copied passport code on a fake is worse than no code at all. It lends the fake your credibility.
What should brands do now?
If you are planning a DPP, plan authentication at the same time. It costs far less to design both into one label or pack than to add one later.
- Design your DPP carrier to the open standards first, so compliance is never in question
- Choose where an authentication code sits beside it, on the same label, pack or product
- Decide who prints which code, and keep authentication codes out of the factory as digital files
- Make sure customers know which code to scan to check the product is genuine
- Talk to us. Book a demo to see both codes on one label, or apply for access
Key takeaways
- A DPP describes a product. It does not prove the item in your hand is genuine
- EN 18220, the DPP data carrier standard, excludes security features by design
- ESPR Article 11 and EN 18246 protect passport data, not the physical product
- A DPP QR code can be copied onto a fake, and the copy opens the genuine passport
- The dual-code approach pairs an open DPP code with a closed-loop authentication code
- Securicode works alongside a DPP. It is not a DPP data carrier
Sources
- EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 (ESPR), Articles 10, 11 and 13
- iTeh Standards, EN 18220:2026 summary (DPP data carriers)
- EUR-Lex, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/161 (medicine safety features)
- EUR-Lex, Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/915 on measures to combat counterfeiting
- BCG and Vestiaire Collective, Resale's Next Chapter (October 2025)
- Rudholm Group, Securicode Authentication
